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UNITED STATES V. REEVES: THE STRUGGLE TO
SAVE THE DIRECT/COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES TEST AFTER PADILLA
Soojin Kim+
Unlike the stereotypical Hollywood portrayal of a criminal conviction
characterized by a trial complete with rigorous prosecution, passionate defense,
and neatly concluded by a jury verdict, the reality is that more than ninety-five
percent of criminal convictions are the result of a guilty plea rather than a
trial.1 Because most defendants are unaware of the potential consequences of
entering a guilty plea,2 defense attorneys are required to advise their clients of
the possible consequences beforehand.3 A defense attorney’s failure to advise
a client of these consequences could constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel, thus rendering the client’s plea decision unknowing and involuntary.4
When a defendant is prejudiced by an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea,
the defendant may seek various types of post-conviction relief, such as
vacating the conviction or correcting the sentence.5
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2009, SungKyunKwan University. The author would like to thank Professor Leah
Wortham and the members of Catholic University Law Review for their exceptional help and
support in the writing and publication process. The author would also like to thank her
family—Chansik, Sunok, Suryeon, Suzi, Mr. Byun, Gunoo, Yebbi, and Jacob—for their unfailing
love and support.
1. See David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1539 (2011) (emphasizing the importance of
providing effective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining).
2. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1143 (2011) (explaining that many criminal
defendants are uneducated and tend to rely on experts to correct the incorrect information
defendants often possess).
3. See Yolanda Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise: Ensuring Noncitizen Defendants
Are Advised of the Immigration Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
169, 173 (2011) (noting that the scope of Sixth Amendment-mandated advice by counsel is still
developing).
4. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (explaining that the validity of a guilty plea is
predicated on whether the plea was voluntary and intelligent and that voluntariness depends on
the attorney’s competency).
5. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (“A plea of guilty is
constitutionally valid only to the extent it is ‘voluntary’ and ‘intelligent.’” (quoting Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970))); Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 495 (1994)
(citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114–15 (1967)) (providing an example of a past situation
where the Court found that a prior conviction could not be used as the basis for sentence
enhancement in a subsequent action because the prior conviction was void due to the presumption
that the defendant had been denied his right to counsel); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1285 (9th
ed. 2009) (defining “post-conviction relief proceedings” as “a state or federal procedure for a
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Within this context, the question is: to what extent must counsel advise
clients about the possible consequences of a guilty plea?6 Clearly, a defense
attorney cannot predict every possible consequence of pleading guilty; there
are simply too many to list, and some may require specific knowledge of a
field of law unrelated to the criminal matter at hand.7 United States v. Reeves
presents an example of a case in which the defendant’s counsel failed to inform
his client, who was charged with a drug offense, that if he pleaded guilty in the
current action and later committed another drug-related crime, the
later-imposed sentence could be enhanced. 8 In Reeves, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the attorney’s failure to
advise his client of the potential for a future sentence enhancement constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel, thus rendering the guilty plea constitutionally
deficient, and, therefore, unavailable as the basis for sentence enhancement in
the later drug offense action.9

prisoner to request a court to vacate or correct a conviction or sentence.”); JOHN M. BURKOFF
& NANCY M. BURKOFF, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, § 1:2 at 3 (2012) (explaining
that effective assistance of counsel is an established constitutional right); Colleen A. Connolly,
Sliding Down the Slippery Slope of the Sixth Amendment: Arguments for Interpreting Padilla v.
Kentucky Narrowly and Limiting the Burden It Places on the Criminal Justice System, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 745, 751–52 (2012) (explaining that the Supreme Court has held that a guilty
plea must be a voluntary choice).
6. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477–79 (2000) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)) (rejecting a bright-line rule and explaining that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland adopted a circumstance-specific reasonableness
requirement); Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 712 (2002) (arguing that Supreme
Court precedent mandates a case-by-case analysis of counsel’s effectiveness); Jenny Roberts,
Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the
Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 132 (2009) (finding that the Supreme Court has not
created a right to be informed of collateral consequences prior to entering a guilty plea).
7. See Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 688 (2011) (explaining that there are thousands
of possible consequences for every conviction and a defense attorney cannot possibly advise on
all of them); Dinesh Shenoy & Salima Oines Khakoo, One Strike and You’re Out! The Crumbling
Distinction Between the Criminal and the Civil for Immigrants in the Twenty-First Century, 35
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 135, 145 (2008) (arguing that criminal cases would never be completely
settled if guilty pleas could be overturned because a defendant was not advised of all collateral
consequences); McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of
Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 835
(2011) (“No one can know all of these penalties, but we can understand their structure and engage
in one of the first lawyering skills attorneys learn—issue-spotting.”).
8. 695 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2012); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006) (providing for a
twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement for a second felony drug conviction); 21
U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (2006) (requiring the United States attorney to file an information detailing the
prior conviction upon which the enhancement is based as a predicate to seeking increased
punishment).
9. Reeves, 695 F.3d at 639–40 (stating that if Mario Reeves’s improperly advised guilty
plea in the prior criminal action constituted a Sixth Amendment violation, it could not be the basis
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The Sixth Amendment mandates a criminal defendant’s right to counsel.10
In McMann v. Richardson, the Supreme Court interpreted this guarantee as
mandating not only the right to counsel, but also the right to effective
assistance of counsel. 11 Although the scope of what constitutes effective
assistance by an attorney is quite broad, this Note will only address the narrow
issue of the extent of counsel’s duty to advise clients of the possible
consequences of a guilty plea.
Because the Supreme Court did not provide specific guidance on this issue
in McMann, in its wake, lower federal courts developed the “collateral/direct
consequences” test to fill the void.12 This categorical rule essentially provides
that an attorney has a duty to advise only of the direct and automatic
consequences of conviction, but not of its collateral consequences. 13 Thus,
under the test, an attorney’s assistance is constitutionally effective as long as
the attorney advises a client on the direct consequences of conviction.14
Later, in Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court introduced a
two-prong test for determining whether an attorney’s assistance was
ineffective: (1) whether the “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness;” and (2) whether the counsel’s “deficient
for a future sentence enhancement); see also 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(2) (allowing a criminal defendant
to claim that his or her prior conviction was established in violation of the Constitution).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); see Romero v. United States, 459
U.S. 926, 926 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the Sixth Amendment requires that
criminal defendants have the right to effective counsel).
11. 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.” (citations omitted)); see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)
(“Our decisions make clear that inadequate assistance does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. A guilty plea is
open to attack on the ground that counsel did not provide the defendant with ‘reasonably
competent advice.’” (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771)); SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J.
FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD 114 (2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has always
recognized that the Sixth Amendment requirement of counsel presupposed effective assistance of
counsel.”).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the
failure to advise on the potential deportation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel
because deportation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea), abrogated by Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (holding that deportation is a collateral consequence), abrogated by Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at
1481; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(d), at 1047 (5th ed.
1992 & Supp. 2011) (explaining the basic difference between the direct and collateral
consequences of a guilty plea).
13. See Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973) (distinguishing
between direct and collateral consequences by examining whether the consequence was a
“definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment”).
14. Id.; see Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam)
(holding that the defense attorney’s failure to advise on an administrative punishment, in addition
to the criminal punishment, did not constitute ineffective assistance because it was not a “definite
practical consequence of the plea”).
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performance prejudiced the defense.”15 The following year, the Court in Hill
v. Lockhart held that the same test also applies to guilty pleas.16 Although
Strickland’s case-by-case approach to determine the reasonableness of an
attorney’s performance seemed inconsistent with the bright-line
direct/collateral consequences test, 17 lower courts continued to apply the
direct/collateral consequences test.18
The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky cast additional
doubt on the direct/collateral consequences test, holding that an attorney’s
failure to advise a non-citizen defendant of the near-certain possibility of
deportation following a guilty plea constituted ineffective performance and
thus a violation of the Sixth Amendment.19 Although the Court declined to
determine the test’s validity, the majority opinion pointedly stated that the
Court has never adopted the direct/collateral consequences test and that such a
test is “ill-suited” in the context of deportation.20 Instead, the Court relied on
the prevailing professional standards and norms in the legal field to conclude
that a reasonably effective counsel must advise his or her client of the
near-certain chance of deportation resulting from a guilty plea.21
Despite the Supreme Court’s decision not to apply the direct/collateral
consequences test in Padilla, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless applied the test
in Reeves and held that the attorney’s failure to advise of the possibility of
sentence enhancement of a subsequent drug-related conviction did not render
the attorney’s counsel constitutionally ineffective because the potential for a
future sentence enhancement was a collateral consequence of the guilty plea.22
Rather than perform a comprehensive assessment of the case’s particular
circumstances, the Reeves court resorted to the direct/collateral

15. 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).
16. 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying the Strickland test to the guilty plea process).
17. Sarah Keefe Molina, Comment, Rejecting the Collateral Consequences Doctrine:
Silence About Deportation May or May Not Violate Strickland’s Performance Prong, 51 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 267, 284 (2006) (criticizing the direct/collateral consequences test as an
“illegitimate” replacement of the case-by-case performance analysis required by Strickland).
18. Chin & Holmes, supra note 6, at 699 (noting that “eleven federal circuits, more than
thirty states, and the District of Columbia” still apply the direct/collateral consequences test).
19. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (stating that the Court has not distinguished between direct
and collateral consequences for purposes of determining whether counsel provided effective
assistance in the past); see also Paisly Bender, Exposing the Hidden Penalties of Pleading Guilty:
A Revision of the Collateral Consequences Rule, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 291, 298 (2011) (“[The
Padilla] decision casts doubt on the use of the collateral consequences rule in determining what
defense counsel must inform a defendant of and may also have implications for the rule as it
applies to due process.”).
20. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
21. Id. at 1481–82.
22. United States v. Reeves, 695 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2012) (confining the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Padilla decision to deportation cases and holding that a lawyer does not have a duty to
explain the consequences of hypothetical future convictions).
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consequences test. 23
Because the Seventh Circuit found that the
direct/collateral consequences test was satisfied, it did not need to proceed
beyond the reasonableness prong of the Strickland two-part test for
determining ineffective assistance of counsel.24
This Note will argue that the Seventh Circuit in Reeves deviated from the
Supreme Court’s guidance in Padilla by adhering to the direct/collateral
consequences test without considering the particular circumstances of the case.
Part I provides an overview of the scope of ineffective assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment by reviewing seminal Supreme Court cases,
including Padilla, and by tracing the lower federal courts’ development of the
direct/collateral consequences test to deal with ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in the absence of clear Supreme Court guidance. Part II discusses in
detail the Seventh Circuit’s Reeves decision and its reasoning for adhering to
the direct/collateral consequences test post-Padilla. Part III then analyzes
Reeves in light of Padilla and argues that although the Reeves court
distinguished the two cases, it failed to explain why the attorney’s failure to
advise of a possible sentence enhancement for future crimes did not violate the
Sixth Amendment. Finally, this Note argues that the Reeves court erred by not
considering the Padilla factors or applying them to situations other than those
in which deportation is a direct consequence of a guilty plea.
I. THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. Strickland’s Reasonableness Standard for Assessing Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment mandates that criminal defendants have the right to
assistance of counsel.25 Early on, the Supreme Court recognized that under the
Sixth Amendment’s mandate, convictions rendered without effective
assistance may be reversed.26 But it was not until the Court decided Strickland
v. Washington that it provided an in-depth framework for analyzing what
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.27
In 1984, the Supreme Court in Strickland articulated a two-prong test for
determining whether a counsel’s assistance was constitutionally ineffective: (1)
whether the “counsel’s performance was deficient;” and (2) whether “the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense [so] as to deprive the defendant

23. Id.
24. Id. at 640–41. As the Court noted in Hill v. Lockhart, the Strickland test is conjunctive,
meaning that both prongs must be satisfied, thus if one fails the Court need not reach the other.
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26. MARTYN & FOX, supra note 11, at 114–15.
27. See id.; see also BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 5, § 1:2, at 3 (acknowledging that it
is difficult to determine what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel).
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of a fair trial.”28 For the first prong, the Court specifically considered whether
the “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.”29
In Strickland, the defendant was charged with three murders and sentenced
to death. 30 The defendant sought post-conviction relief by arguing that the
defense attorney had provided ineffective assistance when he failed to present
evidence of the defendant’s good character and emotional status, which he
argued might have lessened his sentence.31 The Court held that the attorney’s
representation was sufficiently reasonable because his decision not to present
the evidence was motivated by a need to deny the prosecution the opportunity
to introduce rebuttal evidence related to the defendant’s prior convictions.32
The Court found that this decision was the proper strategy under the
circumstances based on objectively reasonable professional judgment.33
When considering the second prong, the Court evaluated whether the
defendant could show that “there [was] a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”34 Because both the performance and prejudice prongs must be met,
the Court noted that it is not necessary to consider whether a defendant is
prejudiced if he or she has already found that his or her counsel was not
constitutionally deficient. 35 But, even assuming that the defense attorney’s
assistance was unreasonable, the Court found no prejudice.36 The Court noted
that offering character and emotional distress evidence would have opened the
door for the prosecution to present more aggravating evidence, thus increasing
the likelihood of a harsher sentence. 37 Therefore, the Court found that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the attorney’s conduct.38

28. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 687 (1984) (stating that defense counsel
play “a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results”).
29. Id. at 688 (explaining that the reasonableness determination is based on the legal
profession’s maintenance of standards).
30. Id. at 675.
31. Id. at 675–76 (noting several challenges brought by the defendant against his attorney’s
assistance).
32. Id. at 699.
33. Id. (reasoning that just because the defense attorney’s strategy was unsuccessful does
not mean that his assistance was ineffective).
34. Id. at 687. To claim an unfair trial and a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant must
demonstrate prejudice. See Perez, supra note 1, at 1541.
35. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700 (finding that neither deficient performance nor sufficient
prejudice were shown to overcome the defendant’s ineffectiveness claim).
36. Id.
37. Id. (“Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no reasonable probability
that the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, hence, the sentence imposed.”).
38. Id.
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One year after the Strickland decision, the Supreme Court held in Hill v.
Lockhart that the Strickland two-prong test for ineffective assistance of
counsel also applies to the plea bargaining process.39 In Hill, the defendant
pleaded guilty to murder and theft and was sentenced to forty-five years in
prison.40 Later, the defendant sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his
attorney had provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him that he
would not be eligible for parole until he had served half of his sentence.41 The
Court declined to analyze Strickland’s first prong because the defendant failed
to show the second prong, thereby failing the conjunctive test. 42 The Hill
decision considerably expanded the number and scope of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims in criminal proceedings because of the high rate at which
defendants enter plea bargains.43
B. The Advent of the Direct/Collateral Consequences Test
1. The Brady Decision and Lower Federal Courts’ Extension of the Rule
The Supreme Court’s 1970 decision in McMann v. Richardson, which
allowed defendants to challenge guilty pleas on the grounds of deficient
counsel, left little guidance for lower courts about the scope of what constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel.44 Fortunately, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Brady v. United States, which was rendered the same day as McMann,
provided some needed guidance for lower courts.45 In Brady, the defendant
received a fifty-year sentence after pleading guilty to kidnapping.46 After his
conviction, the defendant argued that his guilty plea was involuntary and
unknowing because he pleaded guilty only to avoid the death penalty, which
39. 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (holding that the Strickland standard should also apply to the
plea process despite the difference in context as Strickland stemmed from a capital sentencing
proceeding).
40. Id. at 53–54 (citing evidence that the defendant stated during his allocution that he was
aware of its contents, that he understood his rights, and that he was admitting to the charges filed
against him).
41. Id. at 53.
42. Id. at 60 (arguing that the petitioner did not establish any prejudice). The Court noted
that the defendant did not allege that he would have altered his guilty plea if counsel had correctly
advised him on his eligibility of parole and, therefore, it was unnecessary to address the prejudice
prong. Id.
43. Perez, supra note 1, at 1539.
44. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (stating that criminal defendants
are entitled to effective assistance of counsel, but failing to articulate the scope of such
effectiveness); Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based
Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 418–19
(1988) (discussing the development of the Strickland standard).
45. 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that his guilty plea was
involuntary); see also Connolly, supra note 5, at 752 (discussing the guidance provided by the
Brady Court requiring the defendant to be made aware of the “direct consequences of his plea”).
46. Brady, 397 U.S. at 743–44.
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was a possible penalty for the defendant under a relevant statute.47 But, after
sentencing, a subsequent judicial interpretation of the statute prevented a jury
from imposing the death penalty in this type of case.48 The defendant argued
that his guilty plea was based on a false premise about the statute, and was
therefore unknowing and involuntary. 49 The Court rejected his argument,
finding instead that the plea was voluntary and valid because he was aware of
the direct consequences of his plea.50
Even though the Brady decision concerned a judge’s responsibility to ensure
that a guilty plea is voluntary, lower courts applied this rule to the scope of
defense counsel’s constitutional duty to provide effective assistance, requiring
defense counsel to advise the defendant about the direct consequences of
conviction, but not the collateral consequences. 51 Although some scholars
contend that Strickland rejected the direct/collateral consequences test, lower
courts continued to use this test when applying the first prong of
reasonableness under Strickland.52
2. Examples of Direct/Collateral Consequences
Although there are some variations in the way jurisdictions apply the
direct/collateral consequences test, 53 it is generally accepted that direct

47. Id.
48. Id. at 756 (providing that, although counsel’s advice to the defendant explaining that a
jury could impose the death penalty under Section 1201(a) was true at the time, the Court later
held in United States v. Jackson that the death penalty could not be imposed by a jury when
“there was a plea of guilty”).
49. Id. at 744, 754–57.
50. Id. at 755 (“[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences . . . must stand unless induced by threats . . . .”).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Wofford
v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984) and Edwards v. State, 393 So. 2d 597, 601
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Hubbart, J., dissenting)); Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782–83 (5th
Cir. 1975) (holding that a defense attorney did not have to inform the defendant that a guilty plea
to a driving-while-intoxicated charge would suspend the defendant’s driver’s license as a
collateral consequence, which was not directly brought by the court); Barajas v. State, 991 P.2d
474, 475–76 (Nev. 1999) (explaining that the attorney’s failure to inform the defendant of a
collateral consequence did not result in counsel’s behavior falling short of an objective standard
of reasonableness); Chin, supra note 7, at 703–04, 727 (noting that lower courts have adopted a
test distinguishing direct and collateral consequences and criticizing lower courts’ application of
the Brady decision to ineffective counsel cases and explaining that an attorney has a broader duty
to the criminal defendant than a court).
52. See Molina, supra note 17, at 268, 283–84 (criticizing the lower courts’ use of the
direct/collateral consequences test as part of the analysis under the Strickland reasonable
performance inquiry); see also BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 5, at 26 (stating that the
Strickland decision “expressly rejected” the direct/collateral consequences test’s categorical
approach).
53. See Priscilla Budeiri, Comment, Collateral Consequences of Guilty Pleas in the Federal
Criminal Justice System, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 157, 168 (1981) (noting that although all
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consequences are the “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the
range of the defendant’s punishment.” 54 Practically, this means that the
consequences that would be deemed direct by lower courts are very narrow.55
The most common examples of direct consequences are maximum penalties,
including imprisonment, fines, and terms of supervised release.56
On the other hand, collateral consequences of conviction extend
to results that are not automatic or easily foreseeable. 57 Examples of
collateral consequences include ineligibility for parole,58 civil commitment,59
consecutive sentencing,60 registration requirements,61 ineligibility to serve on a

lower federal courts distinguish between direct and collateral consequences, they have not always
interpreted these terms consistently).
54. Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973); see also United
States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 560 F.3d 16, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that failing to advise the
defendant that he or she may face a life term of supervised release—a direct consequence of a
guilty plea—constituted reversible error); Bender, supra note 19, at 292 (defining collateral
consequences as “those consequences that do not follow directly from the sentence imposed by
the court”); Steve Colella, “Guilty, Your Honor”: The Direct and Collateral Consequences of
Guilty Pleas and the Courts that Inconsistently Interpret Them, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 305, 308
(2004) (“The determination that a particular consequence is collateral has, in many cases, turned
on whether the consequence was in the hands of another government agency or under the control
of the defendant himself.”).
55. Chin, supra note 7, at 704 (acknowledging that the Third Circuit has found that the
maximum prison term and fine are the only direct consequences for any particular offense).
56. See United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The only
consequences considered direct are the maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged.”);
see also Barbee v. Ruth, 678 F.2d 634, 635 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that only the charged
offense’s maximum prison term and fine are considered direct consequences); LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 12, § 21.4(d), at 1046–47 (explaining that case law has traditionally emphasized that
the defendant should be advised of both the minimum and maximum penalties available for an
offense); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators”, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 670, 679 (2008) (“Direct consequences appear limited to the penal sanction that will be
imposed as a result of a plea of guilty.”).
57. See Foo v. State, 102 P.3d 346, 357 (Haw. 2004) (explaining that collateral
consequences are unique to each individual defendant and usually result from third-party actions);
Derek Wikstrom, “No Logical Stopping-Point”: The Consequences of Padilla v. Kentucky’s
Inevitable Expansion, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 351, 361–62 (2012) (“If a judge can impose a penalty
for a guilty plea but doing so is discretionary, the penalty is collateral. Similarly, a consequence
is generally collateral if its imposition is contingent upon action by a governmental agency or
another actor outside the control of the sentencing judge.”).
58. See Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1548–49 (11th Cir. 1989).
59. See Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973).
60. United States v. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1987); Budeiri, supra note 53,
at 178.
61. Kaiser v. State, 621 N.W.2d 49, 53–54 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d, 641 N.W.2d 900
(Minn. 2002), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Jones, 729 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2007).
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jury, 62 and ineligibility to possess firearms. 63 For example, in Cuthrell v.
Director, Patuxent Institute, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that a civil commitment is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea
because the plea did not automatically confine the defendant to an institution.64
Rather, a trained expert must first examine the defendant and decide whether
confinement is appropriate, and if so, a jury must then find the defendant
delinquent in a civil trial. 65 Therefore, as a general rule, under the
direct/collateral consequences test, any consequences other than the length of
sentence and the amount of fine tend to be deemed collateral.66
3. Criticism of the Direct/Collateral Consequences Test
Although lower courts frequently apply the direct/collateral consequences
test, many scholars criticize its use.67 Among the stronger criticisms is that
Supreme Court precedent does not support the test’s rationale.68 For example,
the Brady decision, which many courts look to as the origin of the
direct/collateral consequences test, stated that the court’s duty is to ensure that
a criminal defendant’s guilty plea is informed and voluntary.69 Scholars have
argued that lower courts err when they simply overlay the Brady analysis onto
62. State v. Vasquez, 889 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. App. 1994) (citing United States v. Banda,
1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Chin, supra note 7, at 705.
63. Chin, supra note 7, at 705; see generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 21.4(d), at
1046–47 (providing examples of direct and collateral consequences of a conviction).
64. Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366 (explaining that since there were intermediate steps,
including evaluation by experts and a subsequent civil trial, which must occur between conviction
and commitment to an institution, commitment was not a direct consequence of the defendant’s
guilty plea).
65. Id.
66. See supra notes 53–62 and accompanying text.
67. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 21.4(d), at 1047 (advocating for a system that
notifies defendants that repeat offenders may serve higher penalties for later offenses if the law so
provides); Chin, supra note 7, at 723 (“[The direct/collateral consequences test] undermines the
values underlying the Sixth Amendment because it encourages defense lawyers to disregard what,
in a category of cases, will be the most promising source of aid for their clients’ position.”);
Rodger Citron, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve Indigent
Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481, 493–94 (1991) (discussing the systemic claims).
68. See Chin, supra note 7, at 699; Roberts, supra note 6, at 123 (arguing that the distinction
between direct and collateral consequences is “artificial [and] ill-conceived,” and thus courts
should adopt a rule requiring counsel to notify defendants of any severe consequence of a
criminal conviction for an offense charged); McGregor Smyth, “Collateral” No More: The
Practical Imperative for Holistic Defense in a Post-Padilla World . . . Or, How to Achieve
Consistently Better Results for Clients, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 139, 159 (2011) (“A focus
on collateral sanctions sets the bar far too low, ignoring the true life impact important to clients.
It also squanders many critical opportunities for leveraging better results.”).
69. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1969) (holding that guilty pleas, like all
waivers of constitutional rights, must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent); Chin, supra note 7,
at 728 (explaining that Brady speaks to the plea court’s obligations, which even if completed, do
not mean that the plea is automatically valid because there may be independent constitutional
violations that invalidate the plea).
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the over-arching standard for ineffective assistance of counsel because the
defense counsel’s duty must be broader than the court’s.70
Some scholars have gone further by suggesting that the direct/collateral
consequences test is actually inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. 71
These critics argue that Strickland specifically emphasized a case-by-case
analysis, thus rejecting a bright-line rule like the direct/collateral consequences
test. 72 In other words, the Strickland Court looked to the American Bar
Association (ABA) standards, 73 which requires defense attorneys to advise
their clients of many collateral consequences. 74 Therefore, the Supreme
Court’s use of the ABA standard, which is inconsistent with the
direct/collateral consequences test, may indicate that the test is inconsistent
with Strickland. 75 Despite the criticism, however, many courts continue to
follow the direct/collateral consequences test.76

70. Eric Beckemeier, The Surprise Appearance of Padilla v. Kentucky: Practical
Implications for Criminal Defense Attorneys and Possibilities for Expansion, 80 UMKC L. REV.
437, 437 (2011) (proposing that collateral consequences that would alter a defendant’s choice to
plead guilty should be disclosed); Bibas, supra note 2, at 1143 (arguing that defense attorneys
have broader responsibilities for criminal defendants considering guilty pleas because the
attorneys have a better understanding of the detailed facts and circumstances of the case than the
judges do); Chin, supra note 7, at 682 (arguing that a defense counsel’s duty to achieve a better
plea bargain for his or her client should lead counsel to consider and advise the defendant on
some of the collateral consequences of the guilty plea); Christopher Gowen & Erin Magary,
Collateral Consequences: How Reliable Data and Resources Can Change the Way Law is
Practiced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 65, 86 (2011) (explaining that collateral consequences can be
more severe than direct consequences); Roberts, supra note 56, at 693 (“[M]any courts have
improperly imported due process standards into decisions analyzing ineffective assistance so that
the trial judge and defense counsel are held to the same low standard as information providers in
the guilty plea process.”).
71. See Malia Brink, A Gauntlet Thrown: The Transformative Potential of Padilla v.
Kentucky, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 39, 50 (2011) (“The limitation on the scope of representation
that the collateral consequence doctrine created was fundamentally inconsistent with the role of
the defense lawyer.”); see also Molina, supra note 17, at 288–89 (criticizing the direct/collateral
consequences rule as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland to apply
industry standards).
72. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–69 (1984); see also Molina, supra
note 17, at 288–89.
73. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–91.
74. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, 14–3.2(f) (3d ed.
1999) (“To the extent possible, defense counsel should determine and advise the defendant,
sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that
might ensue from entry of the contemplated plea.”).
75. Molina, supra note 17, at 288.
76. See, e.g., Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011) (observing that at
least nine federal circuits applied the collateral/direct consequences test before the Supreme Court
decided Padilla); Bustos v. White, 521 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2008) (analyzing parole eligibility
under the direct/collateral consequences test).
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C. Padilla and the Future of the Direct/Collateral Consequences Test
Recently, the Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that a criminal
defense attorney’s failure to advise a client about the possibility of deportation
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 77
This decision abrogated a considerable number of lower court decisions that
held that the failure to advise about the risk of deportation did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel because deportation is a collateral
consequence of a guilty plea.78
In Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the United States discovered, after
he pleaded guilty to a drug-related charge, that he faced deportation as a
consequence of his plea.79 He moved for post-conviction relief, contending
that his decision to plead guilty was based on ineffective assistance of counsel
because his attorney failed to inform him of the potential for deportation.80 In
reaching the conclusion that counsel’s failure to advise about deportation
amounted to constitutionally defective assistance, the Court looked to
prevailing professional norms for guidance as to what the reasonable standard
for effective assistance should be.81
First, the Court reviewed persuasive authority including the American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice for guidance in determining what
the objective reasonableness standard should be for effective representation.82
The Court held that failure to advise about the deportation fell below the
reasonableness standard because “‘authorities of every stripe—including the
77. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (finding that precedent, the severity of the consequence,
and the impact on families demanded notification of the possibility of deportation as a potential
consequence of a guilty plea).
78. See, e.g., United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 338 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated by
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486; United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 767 (11th Cir. 1985),
abrogated by Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Misrepresentation, or Failure to Advise, of Immigration
Consequences of Guilty Plea—State Cases, 65 A.L.R.4TH 719 (1988) (providing examples of
state cases finding effective counsel despite the attorney’s failure to inform the client of the
possibility of consequential deportation).
79. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.
80. Id. at 1478 (noting that the defendant also claimed that his attorney told him that
deportation was not likely to result from his conviction because the defendant had been in the
country for a long time).
81. Id. at 1481.
82. Id. at 1482 (citing NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSN., PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL REPRESENTATION § 6.2, at 77 (1995)); G. HERMAN, PLEA
BARGAINING § 3.03, at 20–21 (1997); Chin & Holmes, supra note 6, at 713–18; ARTHUR
CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 13:23, at 555, 560 (3d ed. 2004); Dep’t of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, 2 Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems, Standards for
Attorney Performance, at D10, H8–H9, J8 (2000) (providing a survey of guidelines for effective
assistance across multiple jurisdictions); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4–5.1(a), at 197 (3d ed. 1993); ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14–3.2(f), at 116 (3d ed. 1999).
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American Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender
organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and city bar
publications—universally require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of
deportation consequences for non-citizen clients.’”83 Second, the Court took
into consideration the clarity and brevity of the statute in question. 84 The
Court reasoned that although a criminal attorney is not expected to understand
the complex details of immigration law, the statute in question was clear
enough for the court to expect a criminal attorney to understand the strong
possibility of consequential deportation and inform his client of this particular
consequence.85 Third, the Court considered the harshness of the consequence
of conviction.86 The Court reasoned that deportation is a “drastic measure”
that is harsh enough to be characterized as exile. 87 The Court held that,
considering the harshness of the consequence, the defense counsel should have
advised the defendant about the possibility of deportation.88 The last factor the
Court considered was the likelihood that the consequence would result from a
conviction following a guilty plea.89 The Court found that, under the relevant
statute, deportation was an automatic result of a guilty plea and, therefore,
defense counsel should have advised on the potential risk of facing that
consequence.90
In considering these factors, the Court cast doubt on the direct/collateral
consequences test, stating that the Supreme Court has “never applied a
distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of
constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under

83. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, and
Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12–14, Padilla, 130 S. Ct.
1473 (2010) (No. 08-651)).
84. Id. at 1483 (reasoning that when a law is not straightforward, defense counsel need only
notify the client that deportation may be possible). The Court further stated that if the
immigration consequences of a statute are clear, counsel has a duty to correctly advise the
defendant. Id.
85. Id. The statute provides:
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States or a
foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . , other than a single offense
involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
86. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (noting that the class of deportable offenses has expanded
while judicial authority to mitigate consequences of deportation has been limited).
87. Id. (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
88. Id. at 1486 (“The severity of deportation . . . only underscores how critical it is for
counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.” (footnote omitted)).
89. Id. at 1481 (stating that deportation is now a near-automatic result for many crimes
committed by noncitizens).
90. Id. at 1483 (concluding that counsel’s error in failing to inform her client of the
possibility of deportation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
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Strickland.”91 Rather, the Padilla Court utilized a case-by-case approach in
applying the Strickland factors to determine whether objectively reasonable
assistance was rendered. 92 Although Justice Samuel Alito’s concurring
opinion described the majority’s formula as a “vague, halfway test” that
constituted a “dramatic departure from precedent,”93 at least one scholar has
nonetheless championed the decision “as an important step toward imposing
constitutional discipline” in the important realm of guilty pleas.94
II. REEVES: THE STRUGGLE TO ADHERE TO THE DIRECT/COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES TEST
A. Failure to Warn About Sentence Enhancement: Ineffective or Not?
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla, which the
concurring Justices called “a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law,” 95
United States v. Reeves presented a perfect opportunity for the Seventh Circuit
to address whether a defense counsel’s failure to advise a criminal defendant of
the potential to receive a sentence enhancement in a subsequent criminal action
as a consequence of pleading guilty constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.96 In 2004, the defendant Mario Reeves pleaded guilty to possession
and sale of cocaine.97 Three years later, Reeves was indicted and convicted of
heroin distribution. 98 In the latter action, the government pursued sentence
enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851,99 which allows the government to seek to
enhance a convicted criminal defendant’s sentence if the defendant has a prior
drug conviction on his or her record.100 Because Reeves pleaded guilty to the
91. Id. at 1481. The Court suggested that deportation is “uniquely difficult to classify as
either a direct or a collateral consequence.” Id. at 1482. The majority further argued that the
direct/collateral consequence test is inappropriate when reviewing a Strickland claim concerning
the specific risk of deportation. Id. But the Court concluded “that advice regarding deportation is
not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id.
92. See generally id. at 1482–83.
93. Id. at 1487–88 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the majority’s departure from
precedent would result in needless litigation and confusion).
94. Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From
Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L. PUB. REV. 87, 89 (2011) (describing guilty pleas as
“a typically hidden and frequently one-sided process of negotiation that has become the norm for
disposing of criminal cases”).
95. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1491–92 (Alito, J., concurring) (characterizing the majority
opinion as a “dramatic expansion” of defense counsel’s duties under the Sixth Amendment).
96. 695 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Here, we are presented with a pure legal question:
whether federal law requires an attorney to advise his client that a guilty plea may expose the
client to potential sentencing enhancements for any future convictions.”).
97. Id. at 638.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(a) (2006) (highlighting the procedures the U.S. Attorney General
must follow to show that the defendant has a predicate prior conviction); 21 U.S.C. § 851 (d)(1)

2013]

The Struggle to Save the Direct/Collateral Consequences Test

867

2004 drug offense, the government was able to pursue a sentence enhancement
in the subsequent action, possibly doubling the sentence he may have
otherwise received.101
Reeves objected to the sentence enhancement, arguing that his prior guilty
plea was made without effective assistance of counsel and therefore should not
serve as the basis for a sentence enhancement.102 The district court enhanced
the sentence over Reeves’ objection, and Reeves appealed.103
B. Distinguishing Padilla
The Seventh Circuit first distinguished Reeves from Padilla by holding that
the defense counsel’s failure to advise about the possibility of sentence
enhancement for a future conviction does not make the counsel’s assistance
unconstitutionally ineffective.104 In response to Reeves’ contention that the
Padilla decision effectively mandates that counsel advise criminal clients
about a broad range of possible consequences, such as the possibility of
sentence enhancement in the present case, the Seventh Circuit held that
Padilla’s reasoning cannot be applied to Reeves because Padilla dealt with a
very specific and distinguishable consequence of conviction—deportation.105
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that Padilla should be limited to the context of
deportation as a consequence, and, therefore, it did not affect the Seventh
Circuit’s ability to apply the direct/collateral consequences test.106
C. Adhering to the Direct/Collateral Consequences Test
After distinguishing Reeves from Padilla on the facts, the Seventh Circuit
held that it would follow past precedent in the Seventh Circuit on ineffective
assistance of counsel cases for guilty plea proceedings. 107 In doing so, the
(providing for a mandatory sentence enhancement when a person who has previously been
convicted under § 841(b) commits a second offense covered under the same Part).
101. Reeves, 695 F.3d at 638.
102. Id. at 639 (noting that Reeves argued that his counsel was deficient because counsel
failed to inform Reeves that a guilty plea might result in a sentence enhancement if he was
convicted in a subsequent criminal action).
103. Id. at 638.
104. Id. at 640 (explaining that Padilla should be confined to the deportation context because
deportation is such a unique risk).
105. Id. (explaining that the Padilla Court, recognizing the serious nature of deportation,
confined its ruling to cases in which an ill-advised guilty plea is the direct cause of a non-citizen’s
deportation); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (holding that “counsel
must advise her client whether his plea carries the risk of deportation”).
106. Reeves, 695 F.3d at 640 (citing Lewis v. United States, 902 F.2d 576, 577 (7th Cir.
1990)) (explaining that the court would adhere to its precedent in Lewis because the facts of the
case dealt with the possibility of receiving a sentence enhancement for future criminal behavior
and thus was not inconsistent with the Padilla Court’s limited holding to the deportation context).
107. Id. (citing Lewis, 902 F.2d at 577) (relying on Lewis to uphold sentencing enhancements
imposed on Reeves as a result of his prior felony drug conviction).
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court relied in part on Lewis v. United States, in which the Seventh Circuit
applied the direct/collateral consequences test and determined that a criminal
defense counsel’s assistance was not deficient when he failed to advise the
defendant that a guilty plea might result in a sentence enhancement for a
subsequent criminal conviction.108
In Lewis, the Seventh Circuit found that a defense counsel is not required to
advise the defendant about a potential sentence enhancement for a possible
future conviction because that consequence is contingent on the defendant
committing another crime, thereby making the consequence indirect, i.e.,
collateral.109 Relying on this rationale, the Seventh Circuit in Reeves held that
the defense counsel’s assistance was reasonable under Strickland’s first prong
and therefore not constitutionally deficient. 110 Consistent with its prior
decisions considering ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Seventh
Circuit applied the direct/collateral consequences test in Reeves despite the
Supreme Court’s refusal to follow it in Padilla.111
D. Public Policy: Encouraging Crimes
The Seventh Circuit also raised public policy considerations in Reeves.112 In
the court’s view, a contrary ruling that would have required counsel to advise
about the potential for future sentence enhancements would create an
undesirable policy that was unsupported by precedent.113 The court reasoned
that requiring defense counsel to advise about the possibility of a sentence
enhancement for a subsequent criminal conviction based on a previous guilty
plea would lead to the absurd result of requiring a defense counsel to advise
defendants on how to continue committing crimes while minimizing the risk of
being subjected to longer sentences. 114 The court used this public policy

108. See Lewis, 902 F.2d at 576 (holding that a defense counsel does not have a duty to
inform his client about the possibility of receiving a sentence enhancement for a future crime);
see also United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 338 (7th Cir. 1989).
109. Lewis, 902 F.2d at 576 (describing such a warning as “needless” because most
defendants know as well as their attorneys that repeat offenders receive harsher sentences).
110. Reeves, 695 F.3d at 637, 640–41 (holding that defense counsel do not have a Sixth
Amendment duty to advise clients of one conviction’s effects on a future hypothetical
conviction).
111. Id. at 640 (distinguishing deportation, which is a consequence of the immediate
conviction, from a sentence enhancement, which is a collateral consequence contingent on a
subsequent conviction).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (“We pause for a moment to consider the absurd ramifications of the rule that Reeves
asks us to create. Using Padilla as a springboard, we would be forced to hold that counsel has a
constitutional duty to advise the client as to how he might best continue his criminal activity
while minimizing his risk of future punishment.”).
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argument to further explain why the holding in Padilla should not be extended
to requiring advice on future sentence enhancements.115
Reeves highlights the tension between the long-standing direct/collateral
consequences test and the Padilla Court’s alternative case-specific treatment.
Particularly, it demonstrates the Seventh Circuit’s desire to adhere to the
bright-line direct/collateral consequences test despite the benefits inherent in a
case-by-case analysis utilizing the factors set forth in Padilla.
III. THE PADILLA REASONABLENESS FACTORS: THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE
DIRECT/COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES TEST
A. Reeves: Deviation from Padilla
1. The Padilla Decision Is Not Limited to Deportation Cases
The Seventh Circuit in Reeves held that Padilla only applies to guilty plea
cases with the direct consequence of deportation.116 In the Seventh Circuit’s
view, the Supreme Court in Padilla found the counsel’s assistance to be
constitutionally ineffective solely because of the unique harshness of
deportation. 117 The harshness of the consequence, however, is only one of
several factors that the Padilla Court considered.118 Rather, the Supreme Court
questioned whether the counsel’s assistance was reasonable under the
circumstances—specifically, whether reasonably competent counsel would
advise his or her client about deportation as a possible consequence. 119 In
order to evaluate reasonableness, the Court considered several factors, such as
the prevailing professional standards, the succinct language of the relevant
statute, the harshness of the consequence, and the automatic nature of the
consequence.120

115. Id.
116. Id. at 641 (confining the Supreme Court’s Padilla decision to deportation cases and
holding that the court does not have a justification to find that the failure to advise on future
sentence enhancement was unreasonable).
117. Id. at 632–42 (indicating that Padilla’s analysis emphasized deportation’s severity and
suggesting that the Court intended to limit its holding to the deportation context). The Padilla
Court found deportation “uniquely difficult” to classify as either a direct or collateral
consequence, but did note its near-automatic nature. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1480, 1482–83 (2010).
118. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482–83 (considering prevailing professional norms to
determine whether the performance prong was met).
119. Id. at 1482 (“Under Strickland, we first determine whether counsel’s representation ‘fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” (citation omitted)).
120. Id. at 1481–83 (“We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe
‘penalty.’”). The Court noted that professional standards advocate disclosure to the client if the
possibility of deportation exists. Id. at 1482. Furthermore, the statute was found to be “succinct,
clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla’s conviction.” Id. at 1483.
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The Seventh Circuit erred by confining the Padilla decision to deportation
cases and only considering the harshness of the consequence.121 Instead, the
court should have considered all of the Padilla factors, including the factors of
the professional standard, the language of the statute, and the automatic nature
of the consequence in light of guilty plea proceedings with the consequence of
subsequent sentence enhancement.
2. The Supreme Court Formulated the Alternative to the Direct/Collateral
Consequences Test
After limiting Padilla to deportation cases, the Seventh Circuit relied on the
direct/collateral consequences test and held that the counsel’s failure to advise
his client about a potential for sentence enhancement was not constitutionally
ineffective because no duty existed to inform the client about the collateral
consequence of a guilty plea.122 After Strickland and Padilla, however, it was
inappropriate for the Reeves court to rely on this test.123
Specifically, the Supreme Court in Padilla declined to follow the
direct/collateral consequences test, noting that the Court had “never
distinguished between direct and collateral consequences in defining the scope
of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under
Although the Court declined to decide the test’s
Strickland.” 124
appropriateness in contexts other than deportation, the Court’s opinion likely
signals a desire to move away from the bright-line test. In lieu of the
direct/collateral consequences test, the Court emphasized the importance of
evaluating reasonableness under Strickland by reviewing the specific
circumstances on a case-by-case basis.125 By rigidly distinguishing direct and
collateral consequences and imposing a duty to inform of direct consequences
only, the Seventh Circuit missed an opportunity to meaningfully analyze the
121. See Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (expanding the Padilla
decision to a sex-offender registration case and finding that registration as a sex offender is also a
drastic measure much like deportation); see also Beckemeier, supra note 70, at 460 (“Padilla’s
holding should be extended to all serious collateral consequences of a criminal conviction.”).
122. See supra note 116.
123. See Chin, supra note 7, at 699; see also Connolly, supra note 5, at 750 (noting that
Strickland “actively rejects the idea that stringent guidelines should be set dictating the conduct of
defense counsel”); Roberts, supra note 6, at 123 (“The Court should reject the artificial,
ill-conceived divide between collateral and direct consequences and find that only a rule of full
information about any severe consequences of a criminal conviction can adequately protect the
constitutional values surrounding guilty pleas, including the right to an informed, voluntary
process and the assistance of an effective lawyer.”).
124. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1476 (2010).
125. See id. at 1481 (finding that the direct/collateral consequence distinction is improper for
deportation cases); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477–82 (2000) (rejecting a bright-line per
se rule and explaining that the Supreme Court’s Strickland decision holds that the inquiry is
“whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances”); Chin, supra
note 7, at 712 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent approaches ineffective assistance of counsel
issues on a case-by-case basis).
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reasonableness of an attorney’s assistance in light of the unique circumstances
of each case.126 Therefore, the Reeves court erred in deciding the case based
only on the direct/collateral consequences test on which the Supreme Court
had cast doubt in Padilla.
3. The Reeves Court’s Public Policy Argument Is Without Merit
In support of its holding, the Reeves court reasoned that a contrary holding
would create an unattractive public policy.127 In the court’s view, advising a
criminal defendant that his or her guilty plea might cause a sentence
enhancement in a future criminal action is the same as advising the defendant
about how to commit another crime and minimize the risk of imprisonment.128
However, this public policy argument is without merit. Contrary to the court’s
reasoning, informing a criminal defendant that committing a future crime will
cause a sentence enhancement creates a strong deterrent effect.129 In fact, one
purpose of enhancing the sentence of a recidivist is to deter the convicted
criminal from committing another crime.130
B. Analyzing Reeves Under the Padilla Factors
1. Prevailing Professional Standard
In evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s assistance, the Supreme Court
in Padilla considered prevailing professional norms by reviewing the
guidelines and standards of the ABA and the Department of Justice (DOJ), as
well as standards noted in various legal journals.131 In the Court’s view, even
though these sources are not “inexorable commands,” they demonstrate the
“practice and expectations of the legal community.”132
126. See Reeves, 695 F.3d at 640; Chin, supra note 7.
127. Reeves, 695 F.3d at 640; see supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text.
128. Reeves, 695 F.3d at 640.
129. See Michael M. O’Hear, Seventh Circuit Rejects Effort to Extend Padilla Beyond
Deportation Context, MARQUETTE UNIV. SCH. FACULTY BLOG (Aug. 20, 2012),
http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2012/08/20/seventh-circuit-rejects-effort-to-extend-padilla-b
eyond-deportation-context/ (“[W]hen counsel informs the defendant of what might happen if
criminal activity continues after a proposed guilty plea, the transaction might more appropriately
be thought of as a fair warning than as encouragement or facilitation of criminal activity.”).
130. See United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 528 (1st Cir. 1974) (stating that deterrence is an
appropriate consideration in drug offense cases); State v. Jones, 420 S.E.2d 736, 740 (W. Va.
1992) (“The teaching of our case law is that the primary purpose of the statute is to deter felony
offenders, meaning persons who have been convicted and sentenced previously on a penitentiary
offense, from committing subsequent felony offenses.”).
131. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010); see also supra note 82 (citing a
number of professional authorities referenced by the Supreme Court to determine the prevailing
professional norms).
132. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482; see John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja
Vu all over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial)
Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L.
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Following the Supreme Court’s analysis, the Reeves court should have
considered these sources as applied to guilty plea proceedings. First, ABA
standards for Criminal Justice explicitly reject the direct/collateral
consequences test, stating that defense counsel should advise clients of
possible collateral consequences of entering a guilty plea.133 Moreover, the
standards set by the DOJ state that defense counsel should advise clients on
“any possible and likely sentence enhancements in the present and in future
cases.”134
Considering that these standards come from highly regarded institutions
comprised of legal practitioners, judges, and scholars, a strong foundation
exists for courts to hold that a reasonable defense counsel must advise clients
of the potential for sentence enhancement in a subsequent criminal action
because of a previous guilty plea.135 The Reeves court should have considered
these professional standards, as the Supreme Court did in Padilla, and applied
them to its determination of the reasonableness of counsel’s assistance.
2. Succinct Language of the Relevant Statute
The Supreme Court in Padilla held that the succinct nature and clarity of the
relevant immigration statute indicates that the counsel should have been aware
of the possibility of deportation and, therefore, making his failure to
advise unreasonable. 136 The relevant statute in Padilla stated, “Any alien
127, 159 (2007) (stating that the adoption of the ABA standard as a determining factor for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims is a positive trend because it will provide defense
counsels with clearer and more specific guidelines).
133. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION §§ 4–5.1(a), at 197 (3d ed. 1993) (“After informing himself or herself fully on the
facts and the law, defense counsel should advise the accused with complete candor concerning all
aspects of the case, including a candid estimate of the probable outcome.”); ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14–3.2(f), at 116 (3d ed. 1999) (“To the extent
possible, defense counsel should determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of
the entry of any plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the
contemplated plea.”).
134. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 2 COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY PERFORMANCE, Guideline 6.2(b)(5),
at H6–H7 (2000) (“In order to develop an overall negotiation plan, counsel should be fully aware
of, and make sure the client is fully aware of . . . any possible and likely sentence enhancements
in the present and in future cases or parole consequences.”); NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND
DEFENDER ASSN., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL REPRESENTATION § 6.2(a)(4), at
77 (1995) (“In order to develop an overall negotiation plan, counsel should be fully aware of, and
make sure the client is fully aware of . . . any possible and likely sentence enhancements or parole
consequences.”).
135. Chin, supra note 7, at 716–17 (surveying various criminal law practioners’ manuals and
concluding that a defense counsel has a duty to advise on some collateral consequences of a
guilty plea, including sentence enhancement).
136. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (“When the law is not succinct and straightforward (as it is in
many of the scenarios posited by Justice Alito), a criminal defense attorney need do no more than
advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
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who . . . has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law . . . relating to a
controlled substance . . . is deportable.”137
Similarly, in Reeves, the relevant sentence enhancement statute states that,
“[i]f any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony
drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and not more than life
imprisonment . . . . ”138 The provision explaining the procedure states that
“[n]o person who stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be
sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions,
unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States
attorney files an information with the court . . . .”139 The statutory provision
simply requires the prosecution to file information regarding the defendant’s
prior conviction—or guilty plea—in order to provide the basis for sentence
enhancement. 140 The language of the recidivist provision is clear and
straightforward, and a competent defense attorney could easily determine that a
guilty plea would provide the basis for a sentence enhancement in a subsequent
criminal action.141 Considering the succinct nature of the relevant sentence
enhancement provision, a defense counsel’s failure to advise on the potential
sentence enhancement would be unreasonable.
3. Harshness of the Consequence
The Supreme Court in Padilla held that, considering the harshness of the
deportation, it was unreasonable for the defense counsel to fail to advise his
client about the likelihood of deportation.142 Although the Court emphasized
the harshness of deportation by comparing it to exile, the Court did not
necessarily restrict its holding to deportations as the only “harsh” consequence
necessitating advisement by counsel.143 Therefore, it is proper for courts to
interpret Padilla as holding, broadly, that defense counsel should advise
criminal clients on harsh consequences that are reasonably likely to stem from
a guilty plea.144 In fact, the Court of Appeals for the State of Georgia in Taylor
v. State closely followed Padilla and held that a defense counsel’s failure to
consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the
duty to give correct advice is equally clear.”).
137. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(B)(i)(2006).
138. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006).
139. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (2006).
140. Id.
141. Id.; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text (outlining professional standards for
competency).
142. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (stating that subsequent deportation
of noncitizens “is now virtually inevitable” for a large number of crimes).
143. See Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 389 (Ga. Ct. Ap. 2010) (finding that registration as
a sex offender is sufficiently harsh to fall under Padilla).
144. Smyth, supra note 7, at 801 (arguing that deportation is not the only harsh penalty and
should not be unique to the Sixth Amendment analysis).
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advise about the possibility of sex-offender registration was constitutionally
ineffective, in part due to the harshness of the consequence. 145 The court
reasoned that Padilla is not restricted to deportation cases only but, rather,
applies to any case in which there is a risk of harsh consequences enmeshed
with a guilty plea or conviction.146
The possibility of a sentence enhancement for a future crime is certainly a
harsh consequence. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), a convicted defendant with a
prior drug-related conviction may face a prison term twice as long as a
first-time offender.147 Although a doubled sentence may not be as severe of a
consequence as deportation, such a drastic increase on the restriction of
personal liberty is worthy of notification. As the Court of Appeals of Georgia
in Taylor noted, the convicted criminal faces “extensive restrictions” on his or
her life, with a possibility of life imprisonment.148 Even though the sentence
enhancement in Reeves was conditioned on the defendant committing a future
crime, the mere possibility of a double sentence creates a harsh consequence of
which the defendant should have been informed.149
4. Automatic Nature of the Consequence
The Supreme Court in Padilla held that because deportation was a nearly
automatic consequence of the guilty plea, the defense counsel’s failure to
advise rendered his representation constitutionally ineffective.150 In a practical
sense, under the relevant immigration statute, a convicted defendant does not
have any legal remedy and automatically faces deportation.151
In comparison, the language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) also provides that a
sentence enhancement for a defendant with a prior drug offense conviction is
nearly an automatic result.152 Therefore, considering the automatic nature of
the consequence, the Reeves court should have found that the defense

145. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 388–89 (“It is likewise true that registration as a sex offender, like
deportation, is a ‘drastic measure’ (albeit a totally understandable one) with severe ramifications
for a convicted criminal.” (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478)).
146. Id. at 389 (comparing sex-offender registration to deportation and elaborating on the
severe ramifications for convicted sex offenders).
147. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006); see also Brad Henry, 21 U.S.C. 851: Doubling Your
Sentence Under Federal Law, BREEDING & LODATO, LLC (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.knoxvillecriminaldefenseblog.com/2012/03/21-usc-851-doubling-your-sentence-unde
r-federal-law.shtml (drawing attention to § 841’s doubled minimum mandatory).
148. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 389.
149. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
150. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
151. See id. at 1478 (“We agree with Padilla that constitutionally competent counsel would
have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic
deportation. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter
that we do not address.”).
152. § 841(b).
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counsel’s failure to advise on the potential sentence enhancement was
constitutionally ineffective.
IV. CONCLUSION
Reeves deviated from Supreme Court precedent by relying on an incomplete
analysis of Padilla and confining the seminal case to deportation cases only.
Instead of continued reliance on the direct/collateral consequences test, the
Seventh Circuit should have followed suit with the Supreme Court and
analyzed the counsel’s assistance in light of the fundamental question of
reasonableness, which is better suited for the case-by-case analysis required
under Strickland. Specifically, in analyzing reasonableness, the court should
have considered the four factors used by the Padilla Court: prevailing
professional standards, succinct language of the relevant statute, harshness of
the consequence, and the automatic nature of the consequence. Although it is
understandable that it would be difficult for lower courts to abandon the
historical, easy-to-apply, and categorical direct/collateral consequences test,
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights demand a fairer and more workable
standard, such as the one outlined in Padilla. Without such a standard, future
criminal defendants will have no legal recourse when their defense attorneys
fail to inform them of the possible consequences of entering a guilty plea.
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